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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Danish municipalities’ outsourcing and contracting of refuse collection are framed by a complex set 
of ideologies and objectives, besides regulation. Both at EU-level and at national level extreme 
demands for marketization of the public sector are counter-weighed by demands for social and 
environmental considerations associated with the superior goal of sustainable development. In the 
EU regulative complex developments in normative and legal regulation of social and environmental 
requirements to member-states’ performance have co-existed with tough requirements to ensure 
open competition in public authorities contracting. In the latest edition of the procurement directive 
it has been clarified that public authorities’ commitment of private service-providers to social and 
environmental requirements by contracting is perfectly legitimate. At national level the 
municipalities when contracting are obliged to balance requirements to effectiveness with 
requirements to quality of the services and to consider social and environmental requirements. The 
municipalities consequently are left with considerable responsibility and competence when 
contracting a publicly financed service like refuse collection to a private provider.  
 
Refuse collection has been the public service most outsourced in Denmark since the EU-guidelines 
on public procurement entered into force in 1993. In this respect Denmark is leading in Europe and 
among OECD-countries. A recent study of developments in the employees’ working conditions, 
however, shows deterioration of the conditions associated with a decrease in the quality of the 
service with detrimental effects to environmental requirements. The study focused on identifying 
‘best practice’ in respect of taking the work environment of binmen into account when entering and 
managing contracts, applying an iterative, qualitative methodology. Contract documents and 
adjoining materials were studied from an initial select of 30 municipalities displaying indications of 
good practice, and interviews conducted with all three parties involved: municipal officials, 
company managers and employees. Seven cases of relative ‘best practice’ were eventually found, 
whereas the study revealed a general decline in the safety and health standards, job qualifications 
and job security of binmen following increased outsourcing and competition. 
 
A subsequent analysis of the main drivers and mechanisms in municipal contracting and the process 
of marketization to identify the causal factors in the deterioration of working conditions gave 
evidence to a close connection between social and environmental qualities of collection practices 
and a very narrow concept of quality service. Danish municipalities are praising themselves of a 
“pragmatic” attitude to outsourcing of public services, which in the technical sector appears to 
correspond to the use of contracting as a market-instrument rather than as a service-instrument. 
Assuming that private delivery of a public service not per se leads to deteriorated quality and 
recognizing that some companies in the business are perfectly capable of delivering qualified 
service the paper examines the institutional context of contracting. The study demonstrated a gap 
  
between a ‘theoretical’ reality, displayed in norms, rules and policies, and an ‘actual’ reality, which 
is analysed in an institutional theoretical framework. Finally, identifying fallacies and shortcomings 
in the institutional context, possible means and ways to qualify the municipalities’ management of 
contracting and to improve the social and environmental quality of the present performance of 
refuse collection are presented.    
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Marketization and privatization of public services have been on the agenda in the EU and its 
member-countries ever since neoliberal main-streaming of economic strategy took over in the 80s. 
The modelling of the public sector after the private and opening for private companies to deliver the 
public services is prerogative for the development of competitiveness and dynamic in the 
community according to the Lisbon agenda. The EU, however, is also a political union giving 
priority to social and environmental objectives beside economic ones. EU’s “Strategy for 
sustainable development” includes among its main targets “environmental protection”, “a healthy 
and safe society”, and “high-quality employment” (EU 2005). Besides, EU has in both the 
environmental and the social field specific strategies and requirements to the performance of the 
member-countries. The requirements of the packaging directive to specific recycling-rates of 
different materials have particular relevance to refuse collection. In the social area a detailed 
regulation of occupational safety and health requirements exist as well as regulations concerning 
working conditions and employment more generally, e.g. the guideline on ‘Employees’ Rights in 
the Event of Transfers of Undertakings’ (The TUPE-directive, EU 2004b), which is of particular 
relevance to outsourcing and contracting.  
 
The tendency to counter-weigh issues of competition and efficiency with environmental and social 
considerations is evident in the EU-directive regulating the award of contracts to providers of public 
service (the public procurement directive, EU 2004a). Fundamentally, the directive states that it is 
up to the public body, e.g. the municipality, to decide whether it wants to outsource a service, but if 
it so does, the process of competitive tender must follow the provisions of the regulation to ensure 
free and fair competition. Nothing constrains the municipality; however, to take social and 
environmental considerations into account at the same time and lay down conditions of this kind in 
the contract. Two communications from the Commission (EU-Commission 2001 a & b) as well as 
the EU-Court’s verdict regarding “the buses of Helsinki” (2002) have made this clear. 
 
At the national level economic demands in a similar way are balanced by other societal demands to 
the performance of services run by public finance. Denmark did never have a ‘compulsory 
competitive tender’-regime such as the UK of M. Thatcher, but institutions to clear the way for 
marketization have been established1. In 2002 a new Law on Service Strategy (Folketinget 2002) 
entered into force spurring the municipalities to outsource, and most recently by the annual 
agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the municipal sector the municipalities have been 
obliged to increase the rate of contracting of public services. Danish municipalities are 
characterized by a pragmatic approach to outsourcing and have in general chosen to only outsource 
‘hard’, technical services, where the wishes to the quality of the delivered service is thought to be 
relatively simple to transfer to the contract and monitor (Ejersbo & Greve 2002). 
                                            
1 The Danish ‘National Competition Authority’ as well as the ‘Board of complaints over awarding of contracts’ are 
zealously monitoring the follow-up of the EU provisions on competition, the ‘Council for Outsourcing’ is pushing for 
outsourcing, different economic ministries proliferate the advantages of it, and in the state sector special obligations to 
outsource services exist. 
  
 
The term best capturing the strategy of Danish municipalities is ‘Cost-effectiveness’ or ‘Value for 
money’. Effectiveness in public service is, however, a two-sided concept on the one hand meaning 
productivity, measurable in quantitative terms, on the other hand meaning quality, depending on 
how targets concerning performance and outcome of the service are being met (Christiansen 2002). 
Just as an increase in the effectiveness of public services is demanded by the central authorities - 
and implicitly expected to come about through outsourcing - an increase in quality including 
societal considerations is demanded, clearly stated in authoritative documents, e.g. Law  on Service 
Strategy. The final interpretation of cost-effectiveness and the coining of quality requirements are, 
however, left to the single municipality to decide. When contracting, the municipalities are 
furthermore obliged to consider norms and regulations concerning the employees’ working 
conditions and the environment. Refuse collection work has been specifically addressed in Danish 
legislation and since 2001 the municipalities by contracting must take the safety and health 
conditions into account in the contract documents and cooperate in the safeguarding of the working 
conditions. In the environmental field the municipalities are charged with the primary responsibility 
to ensure that the EU-requirements to recycling and environmentally safe handling of waste are 
carried out. 
 
In this complex institutional framework outsourcing and contracting of refuse collection has 
developed in Denmark. Prior to 1993, when the procurement directives entered into force, a 
tradition for contracting the service existed, but on significantly different terms. The contract was 
negotiated with a local hauler excluding competition and a fair, open market. The directive spurred 
a massive marketization from the mid-90s till today. A survey carried out by ‘Local Government 
Denmark’ (LGDK, the National association of municipalities), shows that refuse collection through 
1994-1999 was the operational area within the municipal technical sector that most often was 
contracted out, actually by 71 % of the municipalities. The motives of the municipalities to contract 
the technical services show from the table below. 
 
Table 1: Motives of Danish municipalities to contract out technical services 
 
MOTIVATION SHARE OF 
CONTRACTS 
Value for money 72,3 % 
A private provider 23,8 % 
Savings 17,2 % 
More focus on quality and quality-development  3,3 % 
Other 19,6 % 
(Source LGDK 2001) 
Concerning the experienced results from outsourcing and contracting refuse collection the survey 
shows that refuse collection is the service where most savings are realized.  
 
  
Table 2: Savings realized by contracting out technical services 
 
TECHNICAL SERVICES WHERE MOST SAVINGS 
HAVE MATERIALIZED 
SHARE OF CONTRACTS WHERE SAVINGS HAVE 
MATERIALIZED REALIZED 
Refuse collection 65 % 
Road maintenance 44 % 
Operation of parks and green areas 54 % 
Operation of water purification plant 48 % 
(Source LGDK 2001) 
 
 
Amazing 54 % of all competitive tenders resulted in a new provider. For the technical sector as a 
whole the survey shows that the municipalities “typically selected the cheapest offer” even if they 
had laid down conditions to the level of service and quality, (LGDK 2001).  
 
The tendency to outsource and contract has continued in the technical sector, spurred by LGDK. 
When it comes to waste collection, Denmark is at a high international level of outsourcing, only 
comparable to that of the USA (Elmeskov & Lundsgaard 2003). D. Hall’s mapping of the level of 
privatization in the EU MSW market (2006) did not include Denmark, but the findings of the 
LGDK and later developments suggest that outsourcing in Denmark matches Finland in contrast to 
most other European countries, “where the public sector remains dominant” (Hall 2006:5). 
  
 
 
 
(after D. Hall 2006)  
 
Together with the institutional pressure to increase competition and market in the waste sector the 
pressure from private providers in the field has been constant. Companies have repeatedly used the 
different bodies monitoring competition to seek their interests. Large municipalities who used to 
have their own waste utilities have chosen to outsource totally or partly through the last years 
(Copenhagen, Aarhus, Odense, Aalborg). Interestingly, some of the big international players 
entering the Danish market in the first part of the 90s have left it again later. The reason for this is, 
  
as Danish companies in the business see it, that competition through the process of marketization 
has become too sharp and prices fallen too much (Busck 2006).  
 
Denmark, known for its relatively high interest in and capacity of ensuring social and 
environmental development, thus presents an extraordinary case to examine how such interest and 
capacity match an extreme process of outsourcing and contracting in the refuse collection sector. 
 
 
DEVELOPMENTS IN WORKING CONDITIONS: METHOD OF STUDY AND RESULTS 
 
The social partners of the Danish transport sector in 2002 commissioned Aalborg University to 
carry out a study of the physical health and safety conditions of binmen. The purpose of the 
research was to identify and define ‘best practice’ in respect of ensuring safe working conditions by 
contracting. As the safety and health conditions of binmen are closely related to issues of 
qualification and competence building in the job as well as job security, the two issues were 
included in the research. Critical to the study was not only the contract documents but also the 
follow-up by the municipality in the form of monitoring the contract performance and cooperating 
with the provider. In the contract general requirements to the contractor as well as specific 
requirements to the performance of the service are laid down. Considerations of the working 
conditions may be addressed in both connections. Through the award criteria, further conditions to 
the quality of the service and the performance may be laid down. It is essential for the outcome that 
the contracts address the way in which quality issues, problem-solving and cooperation between the 
parties are handled in the contract period. If there is no monitoring of the contract provisions, 
however, and, most of all, if there is no assistance from the part of the municipality to solve 
problems and cooperate with the contractor and his staff, contract provisions will not suffice. The 
study built on the assumption, which was confirmed by the findings, that the working conditions of 
binmen are only partly determined by contract requirements and quality control or the policies and 
management of the private companies, but further by the conditions under which the actual 
collection work at the citizens is carried out, which are determined by the municipalities through the 
design and enforcement of municipal bylaws.  
 
The investigation primarily built on qualitative material, which was established through an iterative 
process. By a survey of existing literature and interviews with all important actors in the field, 
including the local officials of the Labour Inspection, a ‘gross list’ of elements of ‘best practice’ 
was elaborated. In the same process the number of municipalities and inter-municipal companies 
responsible of refuse collection, where indications of such elements were found, was reduced to 
around 30. From this select of 30 bodies the contract documents and relevant adjoining material 
were scrutinized and systematic interviews carried out with representatives from all three involved 
parties in the actual service, including the municipalities’ officers in charge and supervising staff, 
the providers’ administrative and operational management, shop stewards and safety representatives 
of the binmen. As a combined result of the two methods seven cases of ‘best practice‘ were found. 
In the final phase of the project local and national representatives of the three parties were asked to 
review case descriptions and comment on the general findings and conclusions. The comments were 
included in the final report, which was terminated in November 2005 to be published in 2006 
(Busck 2006).  
 
The results of the research showed for the municipalities as a whole a general deterioration of the 
working conditions of the binmen in all three parameters: physical hazards, job-qualifications and 
  
job security, associated with the marketization of the sector and the municipalities’ use of the 
contract-instrument. In the following, first an account of the results in the three aspects of working 
conditions is presented. Secondly, the results of an analysis of the underlying drivers and 
mechanisms in the marketization of refuse collection characterizing the functioning of the contract-
instrument are outlined. Finally, the institutional context of contracting out is discussed, apparently 
falling short of realizing societal requirements to the performance of the service in relation to the 
market, and possible means to strengthen it presented, aimed at improving working conditions in 
the short run and sustainability in the long run.  
 
Occupational Safety and Health 
The national regulation of the physical working conditions of binmen in Denmark is presumably the 
most progressive and detailed in the world. Due to a heavy pressure from the binmen’s union 
supported by the employers in the sector specific requirements to insert wheeled containers and 
other technical equipment to eliminate the physical strain, including specifications to the access- 
and transport-roads at the waste collection sites were issued in 1993 (DWEA 1993). In general the 
specifications have been implemented; wheeled equipment is being used everywhere. The 
municipalities, however, only partially have complied with the requirements to ensure safe access-
roads. Some have chosen the ‘radical’ solution to require of the citizens to place the site or move 
the container themselves close to the road, where the binmen easily can get to the waste, but most 
municipalities have kept the high level of service typical to Scandinavia and kept the waste 
collection site somewhere inside the premises of the citizens. Almost all municipalities, contrary to 
the recommendations of LGDK, have included DWEA’s requirements to the access road in their 
internal bylaws regulating the citizens’ waste practices, but in general the authorities refrain from 
enforcing them onto the citizens. 
 
The employer, i.e. the service provider, basically is responsible for healthy working conditions for 
his employees. To this end he must plan the work properly. But he is cut off from this when the 
work is performed inside the premises of the citizens, in which case he and his employees are 
dependent on the municipality using its authority on the citizens. In this we touch upon a central and 
not only Danish problem in connection with the outsourcing of public services. The private 
employer who takes over the service also takes over the responsibility for the safety and health of 
his employees. However, as the job is performed under conditions, including physical frames, 
which are defined and set by the public authority - be it the outdoor premises, where refuse 
collection is performed or indoor premises, where cleaning jobs are done or be it the timetables that 
public transport is set to keep - and the authority does not accept any responsibility on its part, a  
‘vacuum of responsibility’ results.  
 
Although improvements had taken place in all municipalities the research showed that a certain 
number of ‘problem-addresses’ still exists, where the accessibility is not in order and consequently 
the work cannot be performed in a proper way. The service to the citizens in general was given 
priority to considerations of safe working conditions. In the contract documents the municipalities 
in general as recommended by LGDK (1999), jealously stated that the company alone boar the 
responsibility for the working conditions, and in the follow-up on contracts the municipalities clung 
to the paragraphs and were reluctant to cooperating on the issue 
 
The statistics of DWEA on reported accidents and muscle-skeletal disorders for refuse collection 
workers in the period from 1993-2002 show a general reduction, close to a halving in both areas 
until 1998-99, where after stagnation and a tendency to an increase enters. This reflects that the 
  
regulation from 1993 in the first instance has been effective, but that the positive effect at some 
point has stopped or has been counteracted by other tendencies (GWU 2004). In 2001 a new 
regulation from DWEA (2001) consequent to the negative safety and health experiences from 
different outsourced sectors like refuse collection, public transport and cleaning entered into force 
obliging authorities involved in contracting of public services to take the safety and health 
conditions into account in the contract documents and to cooperate in the safeguarding of the 
working conditions. The study showed, however, that the regulation had little influence on the 
practice of municipalities. By explicitly renouncing the responsibility for the safety and health 
conditions in the contract documents and referring to the formal existence of provisions regarding 
the access-roads in the bylaws, the municipalities meant to comply with the regulation.  The LGDK 
even denies that the municipalities have any other option (the official website of LGDK & NAEC, 
2006) and posit that an administrative legal flaw exists (Busck 2006). Until further, this position 
remains unchallenged by other authorities, although in practice it has been disproved by 
municipalities that have succeeded in enforcing citizens to improve access-roads.  
 
 
Education and Competence-building 
Employers and employees in the waste collection sector have long been united in the interest of 
establishing education and training and enhancing staff qualifications to be able to meet increased 
environmental demands and qualify the service. In the first half of the 90s training programs were 
carried through in a number of companies and educational modules were institutionalized in the 
national vocational training system. Many actors involved saw a need for new qualifications and 
competence-building of the personnel in the sector (Busck 1991). The study shows that although 
continued interest among both companies and employees exist, the demand for educated personnel 
is almost totally lacking among the municipalities. The contract documents may address 
qualifications by the employees, e.g. “qualified manpower needed” or “staff must be ready for 
training”, but without effect as documentation of education is seldom required and follow-up 
training never demanded. Practice shows that a statement from the provider that “qualified 
personnel are at hand” suffices.  
 
In connection with the modest interest for the qualifications of the personnel very little attention is 
given to an active use of the resources of the employees in ensuring more quality in the service, 
including the achievement of environmental objectives. A few municipalities acknowledge the 
potential of the binmens’ direct contact with the waste producers and use them to control the quality 
of sorted recyclables at the households. Others see them as “ambassadors” of the municipality, but 
except from requiring clean appearance and uniforms, ability to communicate in Danish and 
acceptable behaviour, they do not address the qualifications and competencies of the personnel. 
 
Job Security 
The binmen have experienced an increase in job insecurity during the period. Whenever their 
employer’s contract with the municipality expires, they are in great a risk of getting fired. The 
municipalities, spurred by LGDK and the national competition authorities, prefer short contract 
periods (3-6 years) and let the market decide which company takes the next period resulting in a 
high turbulence in the sector. The new provider may decide if he wants to take over the personnel, 
only very seldom he is obliged to do so by stipulating in the contract that the TUPE-directive 
applies. Unfortunately, the directive does not automatically apply in the waste sector due to 
reservations concerning the field of coverage, when only staff and not equipment is taken over. 
 
  
DRIVERS AND MECHANISMS IN THE MARKETIZATION OF REFUSE 
COLLECTION IN DENMARK  
 
The intensive process of contracting refuse collection in Denmark has been spurred and guided by 
the EU procurement directive, the primary aim of which is to create more competition and market, 
but at the same time carefully designed to ensure that private providers may be committed to social 
and environmental demands defined by the municipalities. An analysis of the general tendencies 
emerging from the study of municipal contracting and marketization of the sector shows, however, 
a series of drivers and mechanisms with detrimental effect to the binmens’ working conditions. This 
is not an exclusive finding. Other Danish and international research have found similar tendencies, 
when studying outsourcing of  public services like refuse collection, cleaning and transport (Greve 
2005, Gustafsson & Saksvig 2005, Jensen 2002, Wiegmann et al 2004). The study did not include 
the environmental performance and results of collection practices, but associated negative effects 
appear inevitable.  
 
1. ‘Vacuum of responsibility and interest’ 
When a company provides a service to a public authority implying that the work is performed under 
conditions that the authority directly or indirectly determines (e.g. by regulating the citizens 
behaviour) that company is utterly dependent on the authority’s formal and informal cooperation in 
the provision of safe working conditions and the solving of problems. If this cooperation does not 
exist, which is most often the case, the employer’s possible interest in safeguarding his employees 
and thereby motivating them to perform correctly and do a better job disappears. On the other hand 
the authority, having outsourced the service, in most cases maintains that the responsibility for safe 
and healthy work is also outsourced and solely falls on the employer. Hence, in practice the binmen 
find themselves working in a kind of ‘no man’s land’, where no one looks after them or takes any 
interest in them except from the simple fact if the bin has been emptied or not in time. 
 
2. Buyer’s market 
In so far the condition of a well functioning market with competing tenders is fulfilled, which is the 
case in Danish refuse collection, the commissioner or buyer comes in an advantageous position. 
When, furthermore, quality requirements to the service, including the way in which it is being 
delivered, are not prioritized, defined and controlled, the market allows the commissioner to follow 
more short-sighted economic interests, and the bidding companies must fight to position themselves 
on the terms of the municipalities. 
 
3. Price beats quality. Contracts used as market-instrument not as service-instrument 
The price-focus of Danish municipalities when contracting refuse collection (cf. the LGDK-survey), 
has effectively excluded the quality-dimension, including social and environmental considerations. 
Other award criteria than price may be found in the contract documents but always with inferior 
priority, and seldom concerning the working conditions. Throughout the period the price for 
collecting a waste container has diminished by 20-30 % in average. The ‘pragmatism’ 
characterizing the practice of outsourcing and contracting in Danish municipalities thus implies that 
effectiveness, when it comes to the ‘hard’ services, is only a matter of cost-effectiveness or 
productivity. Requirements to quality or ‘service-level’ appear in the contracts, but come out as a 
question of constant service measured in the number of ‘no-collects’ or complaints from citizens. 
Refuse collection contracts in Denmark typically fall into the category of ‘hard’ contracts, generally 
described in research, characterized by output-control and low trust. The study clearly demonstrates 
that quality, including working conditions, is improved where the other main type of contract-
  
concept, ‘the relational contract’ is prevalent, characterized by process-control and dialogue 
(Ejersbo & Greve 2002).  
 
4. ‘Discount-companies’ beat responsible companies and innovation 
Waste collection companies inclined to human resource management, cooperation with the 
employees and realizing that quality in the service is based on motivated, qualified and content 
employees are loosing market shares. They experience that even if municipalities include 
specifications to the working conditions in the contract documents, they are not willing to pay for it 
and do not control whether the requirements are fulfilled. It is usual to demand a ‘quality assurance 
system’ by the bidders, but the goals herein are primarily output-oriented, i.e. concern the 
quantitative requirements to collects and no-collects. If safety and health is mentioned in the 
systems, they are without effect, as there is no control or follow-up from the part of the 
municipality. Innovative companies investing in integrated technology to enhance work conditions 
as well as environmental efficiency in expectation of increased quality requirements have lost in 
comparison to companies creative in contract-riding or intensified exploitation of men and material. 
 
5. Frequent shift of suppliers undermines building of trust and cooperation. Transaction costs rise 
The turbulent market, including turnover of personnel, has a negative influence on the quality of the 
service. The short time horizon reduces both managements’ and employees’ motivation to build up 
good relations and competences internally and towards the customers, to perform a bit better, take 
care of the equipment etc.  What is left is cash settlement, strictly complying with the requirements 
of the contract and only the part which is controlled. The winners in the market have been 
consultants providing legal assistance and refined quality assurance systems to the municipalities, 
not paying off, and lawyers defending the companies’ interests. Even measured by the narrow 
concept of quality prevalent in the municipalities a decrease in standard has resulted. The study 
showed a tendency to acknowledge this fact in municipalities that for a period had pursued cost 
savings.   
 
6. The’ vicious’ circle: the municipalities’ price focus  - ‘dirty’ fight for survival among 
     providers -  piecework-contracts with personnel - ‘the binmen-culture’  
The refuse collection business has been “shaved to the bone” as the managers of Danish waste 
collection companies unanimously put it. Consequently, the companies’ survival-mode has been 
intensified work arrangements such as two-shift arrangements and compressed overtime-work, 
which has both been conditioned by and has preserved the collectively bargained piecework-
agreement, which encourages extra pay for fewer men and faster work. The employees and their 
union have clung to this un-sane agreement as the conditions in the business have developed not 
seeing or being offered any alternative. On this background, the so-called ‘binmen-culture’ has been 
institutionalized, meaning that the job is valued for its ‘freedom’. You are ‘free’ to return home 
earlier or with some extra pay compared to other unskilled jobs, just you get your job done, refrain 
from safe but slow methods and keep up a high speed which in fact means running while collecting! 
You are also ‘free’ from anyone watching and rebuking you, no one actually cares about you. The 
culture is nurtured by the frequent change of employer and by the entrance of new workers attracted 
by the ‘freedom’, when binmen retire too worn out to match the speed. But first of all, it is kept 
alive by the fact that no other qualifications or competencies than muscles and speed are demanded. 
Some of the managers deplore it, but admit to depend on the culture. Except from a few cases, 
where other values are in play, the municipalities defend themselves by claiming that although 
trying to enforce their regulations on access-roads they experience an ‘unholy alliance’ between 
  
providers seeking profit and binmen seeking spare time and extra pay. Reaction creates counter-
reaction, a vicious circle is established! 
 
CONCLUDING ON THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF CONTRACTING  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that international research on outsourcing in general finds cost savings as 
the main purpose and deteriorated working conditions as the most probable consequence (Greve 
2005), it is not a rule that quality in general and working conditions in specific must deteriorate 
when public services are outsourced and contracted. “The essence of research (in the interplay 
between the public and the private sector) is that both the content and the form of the contract must 
be assessed in relation to the institutional context of the contract”, states C. Greve, a well-known 
Danish specialist (Ejersbo & Greve 2002:18). By the institutional context Greve conceives partly a 
formal, legal context, partly a more informal, normative context.  
 
Interestingly, the refuse collection sector in Denmark evidently and recognized by its actors 
expresses ‘two realities’, comparable to the above two contexts. There is a ‘theoretical’ reality, 
addressed in objectives, declarations, quality-policies and in normative and legal regulations. But 
there is another less flattering and orderly ‘real’ reality, in which the service and the job is being 
performed. This actual reality is, as elicited, very much determined by the market. It seems that the 
institutions to ensure the realization of societal intentions are too weak or contradictory to tame the 
market forces’ control of the form and content of the contracts. At the same time other institutions, 
rooted in culture and customs concerning waste, interact. Waste/refuse/rubbish is something that we 
do not want to know of and want to get rid of as fast as possible. Binmen better be fast and 
invisible. In reaction, the attitudes and perceptions of these actors associated with the ‘binmen-
culture’ interplays. No municipality will openly declare that it does not care about the working 
conditions of the private employees providing service for it. Nevertheless, in practice they close 
their eyes when breach of norms and regulations by both citizens and binmen occur. This is not only 
about increased risk of physical wear-down of binmen, but also about setting aside solid knowledge 
on the consequences for the job contentedness and mental health of employees from lacking content 
and possibilities for development in the job. 
 
To the same extent that the institutional setting is incapable of ensuring proper working conditions, 
it is incapable of ensuring the environmental results required by societal norms and regulations. 
Firstly, the found drivers and mechanisms in the marketization of refuse collection have similar 
repercussions on the environmental quality of collection practices. Secondly, insofar as the manual 
element is still a decisive variable in collection, the inferior value and importance given to the 
working conditions and motivation of the staff involved effectively obstruct accomplishments 
regarding increased recycling and careful handling of hazardous waste. In respect of environmental 
quality the two ‘realities’ are also found. Although the municipalities advocate sustainable 
development and bear the responsibility for recycling and safe waste handling, they close their eyes 
when citizens drop everything in the refuse container and refrain from using the person with the 
direct contact to guide the citizens into more sane practices, collect recyclables at the source and 
control the purity of waste fractions. A ‘discount’-solution’ has in fact replaced the capacities of 
companies and their employees to fulfil national and EU requirements to recycling. By placing 
recycling containers at shopping centres and maintaining scanty container-deposits the 
municipalities rely on the citizens’ own transport means, i.e. cars and trailers. Over 50 million km 
are driven every year by citizens with the sole purpose of delivering paper, cardboard and bulk-
waste to the collection points (Stefansen et al 1998). It is cheap - when fuel consumption and other 
  
environmental externalities are excluded. At the same time only 12 % of refuse is being recycled in 
Denmark according to the Danish EPA.  
 
To counteract the subordination of social and environmental demands to the market drivers and 
mechanisms the institutional context obviously has to be strengthened or rearranged in a manner 
that overcomes the gap between the ‘two realities’. The quality of contracting and subsequent 
collection practices needs to be focused in a way where social and environmental improvements can 
reinforce each other. As the normative and legal regulations as well as the market are constructed 
the municipalities are in the key position to break the vicious circle, leading to deteriorating 
working conditions and loss of sustainability. For the citizens in any of the municipalities it costs 
less than two Euros a year to have their refuse collected. Would they decline to pay more for an 
improved practice? - Hardly, but they have never been informed or asked. 
 
The first means to influence the institutional context comes out as citizens’ participation in the 
policies and management of MSW. The municipalities in principle are the instrument of the 
citizens, but their practices seem more determined by cost considerations and market-thinking than 
considerations of the citizens’ values and long-time economic interests. Research points to 
willingness of citizens to engage and even pay more for visible environmental initiatives 
(Thøgersen 1995). In some cities successful experiments with multi-fraction source separation by 
citizens in residential areas advised by binmen have been carried out (KMEK 2006). The 
elaboration of contract documents may be an internal process, but the guiding policies and 
objectives need more publicity, as the new Law on Service Strategy actually calls for.  
 
A second institutional means would be to apply a mechanism to make the municipalities 
accountable in respect of quality requirements in their contracting.  Quality assurance systems 
(QAS) are applied in contracting, but have not been effective in refuse collection due to low priority 
of social and environmental requirements and follow-up by the municipalities. Similar to the way in 
which the new, larger Danish municipalities are being made accountable to the national authorities 
of their regulation of the local environment by a national QAS (Miljøstyrelsen 2006) a system could 
be designed to ensure the inclusion of societal requirements when contracting. The state of New 
South Wales in Australia since 1998 has applied such a mechanism, where the local authorities are 
held accountable of ensuring private service providers’ keeping of a ‘code of practice’, including 
working conditions. The Clinton administration’s “Responsible Contractor” is another example 
(Johnstone et al 2002).   
 
A third institutional means would be targeted research and learning to enhance the authorities’ 
capacities in contracting. Decision-makers must be informed of the consequences from not 
pursuing quality in privately performed public service and need tools to improve policies and 
management of contracts. The social and environmental externalities or hidden costs, including 
transaction costs, of the present practice are not considered. The effects of accidents, injuries, tear-
down and expulsion of binmen burden other parts of the municipal (or national) budget. Similarly, 
the effects and costs accruing from resource depletion, emissions and pollution associated with the 
present practice of recycling could be (life-cycle-) analysed and internalised in the prices of MSW 
management. Knowledge and tools of this kind could inform the public as well as municipal 
managers and pave the way to rearranging the practice towards more sustainable solutions.  
 
Finally, institutional initiatives are needed to change the present irrational use of human resources. 
Standards for qualification-building and job-security are needed by legislation or social 
  
agreements. Denmark has had historical success from social investment in a qualified workforce. 
Unless the perspective is to leave refuse collection to companies from other European countries 
with low paid employees in a service-liberalizing EU, the sector needs a lift in quality, which 
eventually depends on a more qualified and motivated workforce. The social partners of the refuse 
collection sector, accused of only seeking profits from the public sector, need to change the basis of 
their present relation; the piece-work agreement with the associated ‘binmen-culture’. Where profits 
today are accrued at the expense of safe working conditions and sound, innovative business 
practices another collective pay-agreement based on acquired qualifications and performed quality 
in the job would change the scenario. Together with an agreed minimum-standard of working 
conditions, including job-security, among the companies a constructive alternative to the present 
‘race to the bottom’ were at hand.  
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